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Abstract
Different methods have been used in the literature to mesure and analyze price markup cyclical behavior.
We use a medium-scale DSGE Model with positive trend inflation, in which aggregate fluctuations are driven
by neutral technology, MEI and monetary policy shocks and, where both price and wage markups vary. We
find that when raising trend inflation from 0 to 4 percent, wage markup is more important than price markup
in explaining the dynamics effects of shocks. Thus, the interactions between positive trend inflation and MEI
shock have greater cyclical effects on wage markup than on price markup. These results put into question
the focus on the price markup cyclicality in the literature which ignore the implications of trend inflation.
JEL classification: E31, E32.
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1 Introduction
Nominal price and wage rigidities are an important component of medium-scale DSGE models,
with price and wage markups playing possibly a key role of the propagation mechanism. Measuring
markups and estimating their cyclicality is one of the more challenging issues in modern dynamic
macroeconomics literature.
Different methods 1 have been used to examine price markup cyclicality and its role for explain-
ing the dynamic effects of shocks in the New Keynesian Models, with mixed results. Most of the
papers have tended to find procyclical or acyclical price markup(Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen,
1986; Haskel, Martin and Small, 1995; Morrison, 1994; Chirinko and Fazzari, 1994; Nekarda and
Ramey, 2013). The others, however, find evidence supporting countercyclical price markup (Bils,
1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). In support of this evidence, modern theories predict that
price markup should move in opposite directions in response to supply and demand shocks. This
result is behind the stylized facts that are at the foundation of modern New Keynesian models
(Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000; Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007; Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 2005).
Accordingly, in light of existing mixed results, Blanchard (2008) argues that : ”How markups
move, in response to what, and why, is however nearly terra incognita for macro. We have a number
of theories. ... Some of these theories imply pro-cyclical markups, so that an increase in output
leads to a larger increase in the desired price, and thus to more pressure on inflation. Some imply,
however, counter-cyclical markups, with the opposite implication. ..... But we are a long way from
having either a clear picture or convincing theories and this is clearly an area where research is
urgently needed.”
The literature on price markup2 shows that it plays an important role for explaining the dynamic
effects of shocks. Most of the work consider the framework where only price markup varies i.e a
sticky price model with imperfect competition (Rotemberg, 1982). It’s clear that with sticky prices,
the price markup varies in response to shocks and that the wage markup varies with sticky wages.
Our main question is what happen if both price and wage markups vary, assuming a non-zero
steady state inflation?
1Nekarda and Ramey (2013) have surveyed four methods.
2To our knowledge, the literature on the identification of wage markup cyclicality is not available. The only
exception is the seminal paper by Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2007).
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To answer this question, we analyze price and wage markups cyclicality using an extended
medium-scale DSGE model. Specifically, we aim to document the determinants of price and wage
markups cyclicality in the presence of a positive trend inflation.
The proposed theoretical framework is inspired by Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015) which
builds upon earlier work by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). They extended this model
along four important dimensions. First, they incorporate non-zero steady-state inflation. Second,
they added real per capita output growth originating from two distinct sources of growth : trend
growth in investment-specific technology (IST) and in neutral technology. Third, consistent with
Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011), they assume that MEI shocks are the only investment
shocks affecting the business cycle. Fourth, they added a roundabout production structure in the
spirit of Basu (1995) and Huang, Liu and Phaneuf (2004).
They use this framework to address two main issues. First, the welfare costs of moderate
trend inflation. Second, whether moderate trend inflation alters the business-cycle properties of a
medium-scale macro model in non trivial ways.
We use the same class of model to assess how positive trend inflation affects the responses of
price and wage markups cyclical behavior in explaining the dynamics effects of shocks.
Our main interest is to document sources of price and wage markups cyclicality in the presence
of a non-zero steady-state inflation.
The baseline model nests a variety of different specifications of the New Keynesian Models,
such as sticky price, sticky wage, and sticky price and sticky wage Model. In each case, alterna-
tive dimensions have been considered. Altogether, twelve stylized models have been analyzed in
responses to neutral technology, MEI and monetary shocks.
We compare contemporaneous cross-correlations between markups (price and wage) and real
output conditional to TFP, MEI and monetary shocks. We use first difference and HP filters, and
set trend inflation to 0 and 4 percent. We find the following main results in our baseline model.
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First, we find that when both wage and price markups vary, the wage markup is more important
than the price markup for explaning the dynamics effects of shocks in the presence of non-zero
steady-state inflation.
When raising trend inflation from 0 to 4 percent, wage markups change substantially from
countercyclical to procyclical in responses to MEI shock3, with significant increases in magnitude4.
However, price markups remain either procyclical or countercyclical in responses to TFP and
monetary shocks respectively (Bils, 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Nekarda and Ramey,
2013), with negligeable impact in magnitude. Thus, wage markup is more important than the price
markup when positive trend inflation is considered.
Our results complement and qualify those of Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015). These authors
find that under zero trend inflation, the steady-state wage and price markups equal 1.2 percent.
With a trend inflation of 3.52 percent, the price markup is only slightly higher at 1.201, while the
wage markup is much higher at 1.28.
Second, The interactions between positive trend inflation and MEI shock is more important
than the interaction with TFP shock, and have greater cyclical effects on wage markup than on
price markup. This result is consistent with what is available in the literature as reported by Ascari,
Phaneuf and Sims (2015).
The contribution of this paper is to document the determinants of price and wage markups
cyclicality, using a medium-scale New Keynesian model with non-zero steady-state inflation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline our baseline model
specification. In Section 3, we discuss the calibration of the structural parameters.We present
results in Section 4, and we conclude in Section 5.
3if first difference filter is considered
4if HP filter is considered, conditional to TFP and MEI shocks
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2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we outline our baseline model specification. More details on it description and
on the inclusion of positive trend inflation, trend growth and roundabout production structure can
be found in Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015).
2.1 Firms and Price setting
2.1.1 Final Goods Producers
There are a continuum of firms, indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). They produce a gross output good,
Xt from intermediate goods Xt(j) that are imperfect substitutes with a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES), θ > 1. The composite gross output is given by :
Xt =
(∫ 1
0
Xt(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
(1)
Profit maximization leads to input-demand function for the intermediate good which depend
on its relative prices Pt(j)Pt and aggregate gross output Xt :
Xt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Xt, ∀j, (2)
The aggregate price indexe is given by :
P 1−θt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θdj (3)
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2.1.2 Intermediate Producers
Intermediate producing firm j uses labor Lt(j), capital services K̂t(j)
5 and intermediate Γt(j) inputs
to produce Xt(j) units of goods. The production function for a typical intermediate producer j is
given by :
Xt(j) = max
{
AtΓt(j)
φ
(
K̂t(j)
αLt(j)
1−α
)1−φ −ΥtF, 0} , (4)
where F is a fixed cost, and production is required to be non-negative.Υt is a growth factor. Given
Υt, F is chosen to keep profits zero along a balanced growth path, so the entry and exit of firms
can be ignored. φ ∈ (0, 1) is the intermediate input share and α ∈ (0, 1) and 1−α are value-added
share for capital services and labor inputs respectively.
The neutral technology At follows a process with both a trending and stationary component :
At = A
τ
t A˜t, (5)
where the deterministic trend component Aτt grows at the gross rate gA ≥ 1 in each period6 such
that :
Aτt = gAA
τ
t−1. (6)
The stochastic process driving the detrended level of technology A˜t is given by
A˜t =
(
A˜t−1
)ρA
exp
(
sAu
A
t
)
, (7)
which, taking its natural logarithm, yields
ln A˜t = ρA ln A˜t−1 + sAuAt , u
A
t ∼ iid (0, 1) . (8)
5It is the product of utilization and physical capital
6With the implicit normalization that it begins at 1 in period 0 i.e Aτ0 = 1
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The autoregressive parameter ρA governs the persistence of the process and satisfies 0 ≤ ρA< 1.
The shock is scaled by the known standard deviation equal to sA and u
A
t is the innovation, drawn
from a mean zero normal distribution.
Cost Minimization
Producer of differentiated goods j is assumed to set its price, Pt(j), according to Calvo pric-
ing(Calvo, 1983) and decide in every period its quantities of intermediates, capital services, and
labor input. The cost of intermediate is just the aggregate price level, Pt. The cost of capital and
labor are Rkt and Wt (in nominal terms) respectively.
The cost-minimization problem of a typical firm choosing its inputs is given by :
min PtΓt(j) +R
k
t K̂t +WtLt(j) (9)
subject to
AtΓt(j)
φ
(
K̂t(j)
αLt(j)
1−α
)1−φ −ΥtF ≥ (Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Xt
The first order conditions yield the following marginal cost and conditional demand functions
for the inputs used in the production of Xt(j) :
Γt(j) = φmct (Xt(j) + ΥtF ) , (10)
K̂t(j) = α(1− φ)mct
rkt
(Xt(j) + ΥtF ) , (11)
Lt(j) = (1− α)(1− φ)mct
wt
(Xt(j) + ΥtF ) . (12)
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Profit Maximization and Price Setting
Each intermediate producing firm7 chooses its price Pt(j) that maximizes the expected present
discount value of its future profit. The firm problem is given by :
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞∑
h=0
(ξp)
hDt,t+h (Pt(j)Xt+h(j)− V (Xt+h(j))) (13)
subject to
Xt+h(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt+h
)−θ
Xt+h
where Dt,t+h is the discount rate for future profits and V (Xt(j)) is the total cost of producing good
Xt(j). The first-order condition for p
∗
t (j) is :
p∗t (j) =
θ
θ − 1
∞∑
h=0
(ξpβ)
hλrt+hνt+h(j)pi
θ
t+1,t+hXt+h
∞∑
h=0
(ξpβ)
hλrt+hpi
θ−1
t+1,t+hXt+h
, (14)
where p∗t (j) =
Pt(j)
Pt
is the real optimal price and νt the real marginal cost.
Since all updating firms will choose the same reset price, the optimal reset price relative to the
aggregate price index becomes p∗t ≡ P
∗
t
Pt
. Then the optimal pricing condition (15) can be rewritten:
p∗t=
θ
θ − 1
x1,t
x2,t
. (15)
The auxiliary variables x1,t and x2,t can be written recursively:
x1,t = λ
r
tνtXt + βξpEt(pit+1)
θx1,t+1, (16)
7The fraction (1− ξp) of the one that can adjust its price optimally(Calvo, 1983)
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x2,t = λ
r
tXt + βξpEt(pit+1)
θ−1x1,t+1. (17)
2.2 Households and wage setting
2.2.1 Labor aggregators
There are a continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1). Households supply Lt(i) units of dif-
ferentiated labor to labour aggregators. These firms assemble composite labor from differentiated,
individual-specific labour according to the following aggregation function :
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
Lt(i)
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
(18)
where θ denotes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between labor types, with θ > 1.
Labor aggregators are pricetakers in both their output and input markets. They sell composite
labor to intermediate producers at the aggregate wage, Wt while each unit of differentiated labor
costs, Wt(i). Thus, input demand for labor of type-i gives :
Lt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)−σ
Lt (19)
The aggregate wage indexe is :
W 1−σt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
1−σdi (20)
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2.2.2 Households
In this economy, households are monopoly suppliers of differentiated labor services. The represen-
tative household has the following expected lifetime utility8 :
max
Ct,Lt(i),Kt+1,Bt+1,It,Zt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln (Ct − bCt−1)− ηLt(i)
1+χ
1 + χ
)
,
subject to
Pt
(
Ct + It +
a(Zt)Kt
εI,τt
)
+
Bt+1
1 + it
≤Wt(i)Lt(i) +RktZtKt + Πt +Bt + Tt, (21)
and
Kt+1 = ϑtε
I
t
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It + (1− δ)Kt, (22)
with
a(Zt) = γ1(Zt − 1) + γ2
2
(Zt − 1)2,
and
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
κ
2
(
It
It−1
− gI
)2
.
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, 0 < δ < 1 a depreciation rate, and 0 ≤ b < 1 measures
internal habit formation. χ is the inverse of the Frisch-labor-supply elasticity. γ1 and γ2 are
parameters to be calibrated. κ is an investment adjustment cost parameter that is strictly positive.
Bt+1 is a stock of nominal governmental bonds in t+1. Πt is distributed dividends from firms, and
Tt is lump-sum transfer from the government net of taxes. Zt is the level of capital utilization and
a(Zt) is the utilization adjustment cost function,with a(1) = 0, a
′(1) = 0, and a′′(1) > 0. S
(
It
It−1
)
is an investment adjustment cost, satisfying S (gI) = 0, S
′ (gI) = 0, and S′′ (gI) > 0, where gI ≥ 1
is the steady state (gross) growth rate of investment.
8Utility is separable and we assume that households are identical with respect to non-labor choices; hence we drop
the i subscripts. For details, see Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
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The investment-specific term follows the deterministic trend :
εI,τt = gεIε
I,τ
t−1 (23)
where gεI is the gross growth rate and grows at the gross rate gεI ≥ 1 in each period9.
The exogenous variable ϑt captures the stochastic marginal efficiency of investment shock :
ϑt = (ϑt−1)ρI exp
(
sIu
I
t
)
with uIt ∼ iid (0, 1) . (24)
The autoregressive parameter ρI governs the persistence of the process and satisfies 0 ≤ ρI< 1.
The shock is scaled by the known standard deviation equal to sI and u
I
t is the innovation drawn
from a mean zero normal distribution.
The first-order conditions for consumption, capital utilization, investment, capital and bonds
are respectively :
λrt =
1
Ct − bCt−1 − Et
βb
Ct+1 − bCt , (25)
where λrt = Ptλt, which is the marginal utility of an extra good;
rkt =
a′(Zt)
εI,τt
; (26)
λrt = µtε
I,τ
t ϑt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S′
(
It
It−1
)]
+ βEtµt+1ε
I,τ
t+1ϑt+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)[
It+1
It
]2
; (27)
µt = βEtλ
r
t+1
(
rkt+1Zt+1 −
a(Zt+1)
εI,τt+1
)
+ β(1− δ)Etµt+1; (28)
λrt = βEtλ
r
t+1(1 + it)pi
−1
t+1. (29)
9With the implicit normalization that it begins at 1 in period 0 i.e εI,τ0 = 1
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2.2.3 Wage setting
Households get to update their wages each period with the probability (1− ξw). The optimal wage
Wt(i) is obtained by maximizing :
Et
∞∑
h=0
(βξw)
h
(
− η
1 + χ
(Lt+h(i))
−σ(1+χ) + λt+hWt(i)Lt+h(i)
)
. (30)
subject to,
Lt+h(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt+h
)−σ
Lt+h
The first order condition gives :
w∗t =
σ
σ − 1
f1,t
f2,t
. (31)
Recursively the terms f1,t and f2,t give the following :
f1,t = η
(
wt
w∗t
)σ(1+χ)
L1+χt + βξwEt(pit+1)
σ(1+χ)
(
w∗t+1
w∗t
)σ(1+χ)
f1,t+1, (32)
and
f2,t = λ
r
t
(
wt
w∗t
)σ
Lt + βξwEt(pit+1)
σ−1
(
w∗t+1
w∗t
)σ
f2,t+1. (33)
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2.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy consists of a talor-type rule. It responds to deviations of inflation from an exoge-
nous steady state target, pi, and to deviations of output growth from its trend level, gY , and is of
the form :
1 + it
1 + i
=
(
1 + it−1
1 + i
)ρi [(pit
pi
)αpi ( Yt
Yt−1
g−1Y
)αy]1−ρi
εrt . (34)
with it and i the nominal and steady state interest rate respectevely,
pit
pi the inflation gap,
Yt
Y the
output gap, ρi the interest rate smooting, αpi and αy the control parameters, and ε
r
t an exogenous
shock to the policy rule, where εrt∼N
(
0, σ2εr
)
. To ensure determinacy, we assume that 0 ≤ ρi < 1,
αpi > 1 and αy ≥ 0.
2.4 Aggregation
The aggregate price level and wage evolve according to :
1 = ξp(pit)
θ−1 + (1− ξp) (p∗t )1−θ , (35)
w1−σt = ξw
(
wt−1
pit
)1−σ
+ (1− ξw) (w∗t )1−σ . (36)
With real GDP being the aggregate production of the goods, Xt, minus the aggregate produc-
tion of intermediate inputs, Γt, where Γt =
∫ 1
0
Γt(j)dj = φ
V˜t
Pt
(
st
Xt
At
+
Υt
At
F
)
, where st =∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
dj, is a measure of price dispersion. Hence, the real GDP or aggregate net out-
put, Yt is given by :
Yt = Xt − Γt (37)
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Market-clearing requires that
∫ 1
0
K̂t(j)dj = K̂t and
∫ 1
0
Lt(j)dj = Lt respectively for capital
services and labor inputs. Hence, aggregate gross output can be written as
stXt= AtΓ
φ
t
(
K̂αt L
1−α
t
)1−φ−ΥtF, (38)
We know that
∫ 1
0
Xt(j)dj = stXt, hence the aggregate input demands can be written as
Γt(j) = φmct (stXt(j) + ΥtF ) , (39)
K̂t(j) = α(1− φ)mct
rkt
(stXt(j) + ΥtF ) , (40)
Lt(j) = (1− α)(1− φ)mct
wt
(stXt(j) + ΥtF ) . (41)
The aggregate resource constraint is therefore given by :
Yt = Ct + It +
a(Zt)
εI,τt
Kt (42)
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2.5 Balanced Growth
Trend growth from the deterministic trends in neutral and investment-specific productivity,
implies that a balanced-growth path exists where Output, consumption, investment, intermediate
inputs, and the real wage will all grow at the same rate : gY = gI = gΓ = gw = gΥ =
Υt
Υt−1 . In
order to induce stationarity in these variables, they are scaled by the deterministic growth rate Υt
, e.g m˜t ≡ mtΥt . Meanwhile, there are some exceptions, the capital stock, with K˜t = KtΥt−1εI,τt−1 being
stationary; also the rental rate, with r˜kt = r
k
t ε
I
t , and the marginal utility of income λ˜
r
t = λ
r
tΥt.
Labor hours, capital utilization and real marginal cost will be stationary, as will inflation rate
and the relative reset price.
3 Calibration
In order to generate quantitative results, a calibration of model parameters need to be settled.
Table1 summarizes our baseline model parameter values into non-shock and shock parameters
(Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims, 2015).
3.1 Non-shock Parameters
We set our non-shock parameters which are standard in the literature, as follows : The discount
factor is set to β = 0.99. The capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.025, corresponding to an
annual capital depreciation of 10 percent. The capital services share is set to 1/3. η = 6 is a
scaling parameter on disutility from labor and the inverse Frish elasticity of labor supply to χ = 1.
Consumption habit formation is set at b = 0.7 (Fuhrer, 2000). The investment adjustment cost is
set to κ = 3 (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005). We choose the utilization cost γ2 equals
to 0.05 to match a capital utilization elasticity equal to 1.5 (Basu ad Kimball,1997; Dotsey and
King, 2006).
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The elasticity parameters for goods and labor are set to a uniform value σ = θ = 6, implying
a steady-state price and wage markups of 20 percent (Liu and Phaneuf, 2007). With θ = 6, this
implies an intermediate inputs share φ of 0.61.
The Calvo price and wage parameters are set to ξp = 0.66 and ξw = 0.75 respectively. The Calvo
price is consistent with the evidence reported in Bils and Klenow (2004) and the value assigned
to the Calvo probability of wage with the evidence reported in Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk
(2010).
For the parameters of the monetary policy rule, we set the smoothing coefficient to ρi = 0.75,
αpi = 1.5 for the coefficient on inflation and αy = 0.2 for the coefficient on output growth. These
values are standard in the literature.
3.2 Shock Parameters
Three types of shocks are included in our baseline model : neutral technology, investment-
specific technology and monetary policy shocks. The AR(1) parameters of the neutral and invest-
ment shock are set to a uniform value of 0.95 (ρA = ρI = 0.95) with the resulting shock variances:
sI = 0.0176, sA = 0.0022 and sr = 0.0019. The magnitude of the three shocks are chosen to
genrate volatility of output growth of 0.0078, with MEI shocks contributing to 50 percent of this
output volatility, the neutral technology shock 35 percent,and the monetary policy shock 15 percent
(Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti, 2010).
The average growth rate of the price index over the period 1960:I-2007:III gives 0.008675. This
implies pi∗ = 1.008675. The average growth rate of the Real GDP over this period is 0.005712
implying gY = 1.005712 and gI = 1.00472 . To generate the appropriate output volatility, we set
g1−φA = 1.0022.
15
3.3 Moments
Table 2 reports the selected moments taken from APS (2015). Some statistics implied by the model,
match the data : the mean value of real per capita output growth, the variability of inflation and
the volatility of output growth at 0.0057, 0.0064 and 0.0078 respectively. The others are either very
close (e.g. the volatility of consumption, Inflation persistence) or slightly higher (e.g. the volatility
of output) if not somewhat higher (e.g. the volatility of investment, positive autocorrelation in
output growth) in the model relative to the data.
Therefore, the model delivers an exact match of the average growth rate of real per capita
output, the volatility of output growth and the variability of inflation during the postwar era and
thus performs very well along usual business-cycle dimensions
4 Results
In this section, we examine the cyclical behavior of price and wage markups in the baseline model.
We analyze the markups role for explaining the dynamic effects of TFP, MEI and monetary shocks,
when trend inflation raises from 0 to 4 percent.
It should be noted that the wage markup is related to the discount factor, the elasticity of
susbstitution between differentiated labor skills, trend inflation, trend growth rates in IST and
neutral technology and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The price markup depends to the
discount factor, the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods and the level of trend
inflation. Also that an increase in the price markup acts as a negative shifter of the labor demand
schedule, whereas a higher wage markup induces a negative shift in the labor supply schedule
(Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims, 2015).
Tables 3 to 8 report the contemporaneous cross-correlations between markups and output across
alternative models. These correlations are either negative (countercyclical) or positive (procyclical)
conditional to individual shock. Figures report the impulse-responses of variables of interest.
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4.1 Neutral technology shock
Figures 1,4 and 7 report the impulse-responses of our variables of interest. They reveal that, under
zero trend inflation, hours (output and real wage) fall on impact in responses to a positive TFP
shock. This causes the marginal product of labor (hereafter MPL) to increase (or the marginal
cost to decrease). Because of the sticky price, price cannot adjust immediately; this gives rise
to procyclical movements in price markup in the short run to nearly acyclical movements in the
medium run.
From tables 4,7 and 8, we see that raising trend inflation from 0 to 4 percent has no significant
impact on the magnitude of price markup cyclicality following a positive TFP shock. The main
raison is that whether trend inflation is 0 or 4 percent, the responses of price level and inflation are
approximately the same i.e the TFP shock has little effects on inflation.
Our results complement and qualify several other contributions in the literature regarding the
effects of TFP shock on the price markup cyclicality (Bils, 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999;
Nekarda and Ramey, 2013; Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims, 2015).
However, the wage markup comoves negatively with real output in responses to TFP shock
under zero trend inflation (Tables 5 to 8). It becomes more countercyclical as trend inflation passes
from 0 to 4 percent. With higher labor demand in medium term, the marginal disutility of working
rises; with higher consumption, the marginal utility of consumption falls. In consequence, the
MRS rises further. From the efficiency equilibrium condition, as the MPL and price markup go
unresponsive consecutive to positive trend inflation and the MRS rises, the wage markup becomes
more negative to adjust.
Thus, the interaction between positive trend inflation and TFP shock has significant impact on
MRS and wage markup.
4.2 Marginal Efficiency of Investment shock
Tables 7 and 8 and figure 8 summarize the contemporaneous cross-correlations and impulse-
responses of the main variables consecutive to MEI shock. Under zero trend inflation, a positive
MEI shock leads to a fall in the MPL consecutive to an increase in hours. With the fall of the
17
MPL, the marginal cost rises. Because of price rigidity, price markup falls but comoves negatively
with output. Following the rise in the hours and consumption response on impact, the MRS also
increases. In consequence, wage markup falls but comoves negatively with real output.
When raising trend inflation from 0 to 4 percent, price markup remain countercyclical with
no significant changes in magnitude whereas wage markup change from countercyclical to pro-
cyclical (table 7) and with significant changes in magnitude (table 8). The interaction between
trend inflation and MEI shock has stronger distorting effects as the response of wage dispersion is
much stronger than the price dispersion. It leads to the threads of wage erosion. In consequence,
households set higher wage markup with a higher trend inflation.
Thus, the interplay between non-zero steady-state inflation and MEI shock has greater impact
on wage markup than on price markup.
4.3 Monetary Policy shock
In our baseline model, monetary policy shock indirectly impacts on the MPL and labor demand
schedules through its effects on intermediate inputs and capital utilization. Figure 9 gives the
impulse-responses of variables consecutive to a positive monetary policy shock. It leads to lower
real output (MPL, intermediate inputs, capital utilization,...) and consumption. Meanwhile, the
lower demand for good pushes down the demand for labor input. With lower labor demand, the
marginal disutility of working falls; with lower consumption, the marginal utility of consumption
rises. Thus, MRS falls so does the real wage. Since the real wage is part of the real marginal
cost, the later falls so the price markup rises but comoves negatively with real output. From the
efficiency equilibrium condition, as MPL and MRS fall, price markup rises so the wage markup
rises to adjust (Tables 7 and 8).
When raising trend inflation from 0 to 4 percent there is relatively small impact on MPL, MRS,
price and wage markups. Thus, the interaction between positive trend inflation and monetary
policy shock has no significant impact on price and wage markups i.e trend inflation has little
distorting effects on the effciency equilibrium condition (Figure 9). Our results are consistent with
findings reported by APS (2015).
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5 Conclusion
This paper examines the cyclical behavior of price and wage markups in the News Keynesians
Models and their role for explaining the dynamics effects of shocks, when positive trend inflation
is considered.
In the literature much more attention has been putted on price markup cyclicality (Bils, 1987;
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Nekarda and Ramey, 2013).
We use an extended medium-scale DSGE model, where both price and wage markup vary in
the presence of a non-zero trend inflation. In this framework, aggregate fluctuations are driven by
TFP, MEI and monetary shocks.
The results show that when raising trend inflation from 0 to 4 percent, wage markup is more
important than price markup in explaining the dynamics effects of shocks. We also find that the
interactions between positive trend inflation and MEI shock are more important than the one with
TFP shock and have greater cyclical effects on wage markup than on price markup.
Our results complement and qualify those of Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015). Thus, the focus
on price markup cyclicality in the literature ignore positive trend inflation implications.
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Table 1: Model calibration
Parameter Description Value
Non-Shock :
β Time discount factor 0.99
δ Depreciation rate on physical capital 0.025
α Capital services share 1/3
η Weight on labor disutility 6
χ Inverse Frisch elasticity 1
b Habit formation parameter 0.7
κ Investment adjustment cost parameter 3
γ2 Capital utilization elasticity 0.05
θ Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods 6
σ Elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor types 6
ξp Calvo price probability 2/3
ξw Calvo wage probability 2/3
φ Intermediate inputs share 0.61
ρi Taylor rule smoothing coefficient 0.75
αpi Taylor rule inflation coefficient 1.5
αy Taylor rule output growth coefficient 0.2
Shock :
ρr Monetary policy shock, error term autocorrelation 0
sr Standard deviation of the monetary shock 0.0019
gA Neutral productivity growth in trend output 1.0025
1−φ
ρA Neutral productivity shock, error term autocorrelation 0.95
sA Standard deviation of the neutral shock 0.0022
gI Investment-specific productivity growth in trend output 1.0025
ρI Investment productivity shock, error term autocorrelation 0.95
sI Standard deviation of the MEI shock 0.0176
Source : APS (2015)
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Table 2: Moments
E(∆Y ) σ(∆Y ) σ(∆I) σ(∆C) ρ1(∆Y )
Model 0.0057 0.0078 0.0247 0.0048 0.539
Data (0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0202) (0.0047) (0.363)
σ(Y hp) σ(Chp) σ(Ihp) σ(pi) ρ1(pi)
Model 0.0169 0.0089 0.0555 0.0064 0.892
Data (0.0162) (0.0086) (0.0386) (0.0064) (0.907)
Source : APS (2015)
Table 3: Cross Correlation Across Models with Staggered Price-Setting
(First Difference - filtered)
pi∗=1.00
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SP -0.0325 – -0.0325 -0.1198 – -0.1198 -0.9446 – -0.9446
SPRP 0.0718 – 0.0718 -0.8204 – -0.8204 -0.8863 – -0.8863
SPG -0.0620 – -0.0620 -0.6017 - -0.6017 -0.9487 – -0.9487
SPRPG 0.0505 – 0.0505 -0.9438 – -0.9438 -0.8923 – -0.8923
pi∗=1.04
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SP -0.0583 – -0.0583 0.0205 – 0.0205 -0.9530 – -0.9530
SPRP 0.0601 – 0.0601 -0.5762 – -0.5762 -0.9020 – -0.9020
SPG -0.0921 – -0.0921 -0.4161 - -0.4161 -0.9556 – -0.9556
SPRPG 0.0349 – 0.0349 -0.9604 – -0.9604 -0.9059 – -0.9059
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Table 4: Cross Correlation Across Models with Staggered Price-Setting
(HP-filtered)
pi∗=1.00
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SP 0.7445 – 0.7445 0.3594 – 0.3594 -0.7122 – -0.7122
SPRP 0.8626 – 0.8626 -0.1024 – -0.1024 -0.7374 – -0.7374
SPG 0.7203 – 0.7203 -0.1279 - -0.1279 -0.7011 – -0.7011
SPRPG 0.8458 – 0.8458 -3807 – -3807 -0.7252 – -0.7252
pi∗=1.04
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SP 0.7413 – 0.7413 0.5757 – 0.5757 -0.6704 – -0.6704
SPRP 0.8657 – 0.8657 0.0797 – 0.797 -0.6937 – -0.6937
SPG 0.7125 – 0.7125 0.0308 - 0.0308 -0.6621 – -0.6621
SPRPG 0.8460 – 0.8460 -3033 – -3033 -0.6842 – -0.6842
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Table 5: Cross Correlation Across Models with Staggered Wage -Setting
(First Difference - filtered)
pi∗=1.00
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SW - -0.6093 -0.6093 - -0.1932 -0.1932 - -0.8286 -0.8286
SWRP - -0.6472 -0.6472 - -0.5249 -0.5249 - -0.8054 -0.8054
SWG - -0.7447 -0.7447 - -0.0140 -0.0140 - -0.8303 -0.8303
SWRPG - -0.7836 -0.7836 - -0.4968 -0.4968 - -0.8070 -0.8070
pi∗=1.04
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SW - -0.6601 -0.6601 - 0.4738 0.4738 - -0.8280 -0.8280
SWRP - -0.7131 -0.7131 - 0.4598 0.4598 - -0.8049 -0.8049
SWG - -0.8252 -0.8252 - 0.6441 0.6441 - -0.8297 -0.8297
SWRPG - -0.8663 -0.8663 - 0.5994 0.5994 - -0.8067 -0.8067
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Table 6: Cross Correlation Across Models with Staggered Wage -Setting
(HP-filtered)
pi∗=1.00
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SW - -0.3865 -0.3865 - 0.5892 0.5892 - -0.7854 -0.7854
SWRP - -0.5255 -0.5255 - 0.4112 0.4112 - -0.8133 -0.8133
SWG - -0.4319 -0.4319 - 0.6826 0.6826 - -0.7779 -0.7779
SWRPG - -0.5611 -0.5611 - 0.4202 0.4202 - -0.8065 -0.8065
pi∗=1.04
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SW - -0.3668 -0.3668 - 0.8792 0.8792 - -0.7862 -0.7862
SWRP - -0.5148 -0.5148 - 0.8334 0.8334 - -0.8143 -0.8143
SWG - -0.4072 -0.4072 - 0.5305 0.5305 - -0.7796 -0.7796
SWRPG - -0.5362 -0.5362 - 0.4724 0.4724 - -0.8083 -0.8083
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Table 7: Cross Correlation Across Models with Staggered Price and Wage Setting
(First Difference - filtered)
pi∗=1.00
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SPSW 0.1318 -0.4184 -0.0826 -0.8959 -0.4240 -0.6022 -0.9926 -0.8078 -0.8314
SPSWRP 0.1585 -0.6161 -0.2016 -0.9533 -0.9752 -0.9817 -0.9941 -0.7513 -0.7670
SPSWG 0.1128 -0.5558 -0.1458 -0.8707 -0.7200 0.4361 -0.9930 -0.8107 -0.8327
SPSWRPG 0.1408 -0.8248 -0.3329 -0.9425 -0.8806 -0.9148 -0.9953 -0.7558 -0.7705
pi∗=1.04
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SPSW 0.1151 -0.3577 -0.0673 -0.8623 0.4254 0.2883 -0.9905 -0.8124 -0.8371
SPSWRP 0.1443 -0.5318 -0.1464 -0.9395 0.1596 -0.1418 -0.9914 -0.7603 -0.7764
SPSWG 0.0948 -0.5584 -0.1507 -0.8878 0.6289 -0.9304 -0.9914 -0.8149 -0.8377
SPSWRPG 0.1250 -0.9066 -0.3487 -0.9318 0.0007 -0.4133 -0.9936 -0.7644 -0.7792
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Table 8: Cross Correlation Across Models with Staggered Price and Wage Setting
(HP-filtered)
pi∗=1.00
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SPSW 0.8937 0.0582 0.6418 -0.4462 0.3771 0.2034 -0.2755 -0.7844 -0.7500
SPSWRP 0.9267 -0.2246 0.4495 -0.3247 -0.0797 -0.1233 -0.2174 -0.8405 -0.8189
SPSWG 0.8799 -0.0331 0.5819 -0.4682 0.1754 -0.0914 -0.2924 -0.7728 -0.7409
SPSWRPG 0.9135 -0.3371 0.3242 -0.3572 -0.4330 -0.4201 -0.2375 -0.8272 -0.8068
pi∗=1.04
Neutral Shock MEI Shock Monetary Shock
Model µp µw µ µp µw µ µp µw µ
SPSW 0.8900 0.2974 0.7201 -0.4161 0.9200 0.9141 -0.2462 -0.7719 -0.7342
SPSWRP 0.9224 0.1396 0.6584 -0.3074 0.7962 0.5626 -0.1945 -0.8254 -0.8022
SPSWG 0.8739 0.1596 0.6514 -0.3973 0.4278 0.3856 -0.2744 -0.7602 -0.7262
SPSWRPG 0.9072 -0.0997 0.4981 -0.3114 -0.0919 -0.3975 -0.2286 -0.8111 -0.7899
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Figure 1: TFP shock, SPRPG Model
30
Figure 2: MEI shock, SPRPG Model
31
Figure 3: Monetary shock, SPRPG Model
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Figure 4: TFP shock, SWRPG Model
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Figure 5: MEI shock, SWRPG Model
34
Figure 6: Monetary shock, SWRPG Model
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Figure 7: TFP shock, SPSWRPG Model
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Figure 8: MEI shock, SPSWRPG Model
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Figure 9: Monetary shock, SPSWRPG Model
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